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In many developing countries, increas-
ing international integration has been accom-
panied by rising wage inequality, and 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin models, which rely 
on between-sector reallocations to link trade and 
labor-market outcomes, are difficult to reconcile 
with this pattern (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). 
Recently, researchers have proposed a number 
of potential within-sector explanations based on 
the behavior of heterogeneous firms, involving 
technology choice, quality upgrading, search 
and bargaining, or fair wages, among other 
mechanisms.1 There is evidence at the plant 
level to support a within-sector link between 
trade and inequality. For instance, Verhoogen 
(2008) finds that initially larger, higher-pro-
ductivity Mexican plants had higher export pro-
pensity and wages in cross-section in 1993 and 
1 See, on technology choice, Yeaple (2005) and Bustos 
(2011); on quality upgrading, Verhoogen (2008); on search 
and bargaining, Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008); 
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010); Felbermayr, Prat, 
and Schmerer (2011); and Coşar, Guner, and Tybout (2010); 
on fair wages, Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Amiti 
and Davis (2012). 
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that they were more likely to increase exports 
and wages in response to the late-1994 devalu-
ation of the peso. The shock to exporting thus 
arguably increased dispersion in wages between 
plants within sectors.
At the plant level, however, many of the pro-
posed within-sector mechanisms carry similar 
observable implications. Distinguishing among 
the various mechanisms will require moving to 
a lower level of disaggregation, and exploiting 
information at the level of individual workers 
within plants. In this short article and the lon-
ger article to which it is a companion (Frías, 
Kaplan, and Verhoogen 2011), we use employer-
employee data from Mexico and an identifica-
tion strategy from Verhoogen (2008) to examine 
the effects of exporting on wage outcomes that 
are not available in standard plant-level  datasets. 
In Frías, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2011), we 
estimate the effect of exporting on wage premia, 
defined as wages above what individual workers 
would expect to earn elsewhere in the labor mar-
ket. Wage premia are estimated as plant effects, 
controlling flexibly for individual heterogeneity 
(and allowing the return to worker ability to vary 
over time), implicitly assuming that the plant 
effect is the same for all employed workers.
In this short article, by contrast, we do not 
attempt to control for worker heterogeneity, but 
instead focus on the effect of exporting on the 
shape of within-plant wage distributions. As we 
show in more detail below, we find that export-
ing has little effect on wages at the low end of the 
wage spectrum within plants, and that it raises 
within-plant wage dispersion, but not uniformly 
between all quantiles. The results are consistent 
with, but add important qualifications to, the 
finding of Verhoogen (2008) in plant-level data 
that exporting raised the ratio of white-collar to 
blue-collar average wages.
This article is related to an active theory lit-
erature on trade, matching, and organizations 
which has proposed a variety of mechanisms 
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 linking trade and wage distributions within 
firms.2 Recent papers using employer-employee 
data to investigate the consequences of trade for 
labor-market outcomes (without focusing on 
the overall within-plant distributions) include 
Krishna, Poole, and Senses (2011); Hummels et 
al. (2011); and Davidson et al. (2011); see Frías, 
Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2011) for a fuller lit-
erature review.
I. Data and Econometric Strategy
The dataset we employ is a balanced panel 
of plants that can be linked between a standard 
plant panel, the Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA), 
and employer-employee data from the adminis-
trative records of the Mexican social security 
agency, the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 
(IMSS). For details, refer to Frías, Kaplan, and 
Verhoogen (2011).3 In this article, we focus on 
2,531 plants with complete data over the 1993–
2001 period. Online Appendix Table A1 reports 
summary statistics by export status for 1993. It 
is worth emphasizing that plants in the linked 
EIA-IMSS sample are larger and have higher 
wages than the typical Mexican establishment.4
To fix ideas, consider the following model:
(1)  y jt = θ e jt + γ  ̂  
 
 λjt × t +  μ j 
 +  ξ kt +  ψ rt +  u jt ,
where j and t index plants and years; y is a plant-
level wage outcome; e is a measure of export 
status, either export share of sales or an indicator 
for exports being greater than zero;  μ j is a plant 
fixed effect;  ξ kt and  ψ rt are industry-year and 
region (state)-year effects; and  u jt is a mean-zero 
2 This literature is too large to do justice to here; see 
Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) for a review. 
3 One detail is particularly relevant: the IMSS top-code 
varied over the period, and in particular was raised in 1994 
and 1995. In results available from the authors, we redo our 
estimates using plants for which the top- and bottom-codes 
are never binding at ninetieth and tenth percentiles, respec-
tively, and find that our qualitative results are robust. 
4 Daily wages in the IMSS data are lower on average than 
eight times hourly wages in the EIA; this may reflect part-
time work. Underreporting is also a possible explanation, 
although Kumler, Verhoogen, and Frías (2012) investigate 
the extent of underreporting, comparing the administrative 
records to household data by region and demographic group, 
and find little evidence of underreporting among large manu-
facturing plants that respond on a regular basis to the EIA. 
disturbance.  ̂  
 
 λ is a proxy for a plant’s underlying 
productivity (i.e., a Melitz-type draw), which 
here will be plant size, and t is year; the  ̂  
 
 λjt × t 
term captures differential trends by plant size, 
for reasons that will be made clear below. The 
primary outcomes,  y jt , of interest are wage lev-
els at various quantiles of within-plant distribu-
tions; following common practice, we focus on 
the tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and 
ninetieth percentiles.5 Note that the individual at 
a given percentile within a plant will not be the 
same over time; our results should be interpreted 
as characterizing changes in the shape of within-
plant distributions, not in wages of particular 
individuals.
Export status in (1) is likely to be endog-
enous. Suppose, for instance, that plants are 
subject to unobserved time-varying productivity 
shocks; a positive shock would be expected both 
to raise wages and induce the plant to increase 
exports, generating positive bias in estimates of 
θ. On the other hand, there may be reverse cau-
sation: if firms are subject to labor cost shocks, 
an increase in wages may induce firms to reduce 
exports, generating a negative bias in estimates 
of θ.6 To address endogeneity, we follow the 
strategy of Verhoogen (2008) and use the inter-
action of the late-1994 peso devaluation with 
initial plant size as a source of exogenous varia-
tion in the incentive to export. Online Appendix 
Figure A1 plots the Mexican real exchange rate 
over the 1989–2004 period; online Appendix 
Figure A2 plots export share of sales and the 
fraction exporter over time in our balanced 
panel. The magnitudes of the devaluation and 
the subsequent export response are striking.7 
5 In principle, one could write a model like (1) at the 
individual level and estimate a set of conditional quantile 
regressions. But to our knowledge the econometric literature 
does not yet provide an estimator that can deal simultane-
ously with an endogenous covariate (export status) and the 
incidental fixed-effect parameters. Here we focus on simple 
least-squares regressions and leave the development of such 
a method for future work. 
6 Although the EIA dataset is supposed to exclude maqui-
ladoras (assembly-for-export plants), it is possible that 
some plants shifted to an assembly-for-export model over 
the study period; this shift may well have generated a nega-
tive correlation between the change in export share and the 
change in wages within plants that should arguably not be 
attributed to an effect of exporting per se. 
7 Note that wages overall fell in real terms during the peso 
crisis; the key fact for our purposes is that they fell relatively 
less in initially larger, higher–export propensity plants. 
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Theoretical considerations would  suggest that 
larger, more productive plants would be more 
likely to increase exports in response to the 
shock; see Verhoogen (2008). This, in turn, sug-
gests that initial size interacted with the shock 
could serve as an instrument for exporting. A 
potential concern with this strategy is that there 
may be differential trends between larger and 
smaller plants, independent of the effect of the 
devaluation on the incentive to export. For this 
reason, we allow for a constant differential trend 
between larger and smaller plants and compare 
two periods, the period of the peso crisis and its 
immediate aftermath (1993–1997) and a later 
period without a devaluation (1997–2001).
Formally, we first write (1) in first differences, 
stacking the differences for the 1993–1997 and 
1997–2001 periods:8
(2) Δ  y jt = θ Δ  e jt +  ̇  ξkt +  ̇  ψrt 
 + γ  ̂  
 
 λjt +  ̇  ujt ,
where Δ y jt =  y jt+4 −  y jt ; Δ e jt =  e jt+4 −  e jt ; 
 ̇  ξkt and  ̇  ψrt and  ̇  ujt are again an industry-year 
effect, a region-year effect, and a mean-zero 
disturbance. In the context of (2), our strategy 
is to instrument Δ e jt with  ̂  
 
 λjt interacted with 
an indicator for the peso-crisis period—that 
is,  ̂  
 
 λjt ×  t 93−97 where  t 93−97 is an indicator 
for the 1993-1997 period. The instrumental-
variables (IV) estimate of θ will thus be based 
on changes in export status induced by the 
interaction of initial size and the devaluation, 
separate from underlying differential trends 
between larger and smaller plants. Here we 
use log employment from the IMSS data as our 
proxy for a plant’s underlying Melitz draw,  ̂  
 
 λjt .9
A thorny issue of interpretation is that exports 
and wages in a given period are simultaneous 
choices, presumably outcomes of the same firm 
optimization problem, and it may be unclear 
how to think about an “effect” of one on the 
other. One way to sidestep this difficulty is to 
focus on the reduced form corresponding to the 
8 The results are robust to changes in the beginning and 
end dates of the periods. 
9 Verhoogen (2008) focused on domestic sales as the pre-
ferred proxy for λ but showed that the basic patterns were 
robust to the choice of proxy. Here we use employment from 
the IMSS data to avoid difficulties arising from the fact that 
domestic sales enter in the denominator of export share. 
IV model and think of the devaluation as gen-
erating exogenous variation in the incentive to 
export. Here we present both IV and reduced-
form results.10
II. Results
Table 1 presents simple cross-sectional 
regressions of wage outcomes on export status 
(either a 0/1 exporter indicator or export share 
of sales) or plant size (log employment), for 
the year 1993.11 As is common in other data-
sets, exporting and plant size are associated 
with higher wages on average. Overall, there is 
little evidence of systematic differences in the 
cross-sectional wage-exporting or wage-size 
relationships across quantiles; the differences in 
estimates across columns 3–7 are generally not 
significant.
Table 2 examines changes in the wage out-
comes over time. Panels A and B present 
OLS regressions of (2). Perhaps surprisingly, 
there is little robust evidence that within-
plant increases in exports are associated with 
increases in wages, when controlling for differ-
ential trends by plant size. These results should 
be treated with caution, however, as the pos-
sible endogeneity of export status has not been 
addressed.
Columns 1–7 of panel C present the reduced-
form estimates corresponding to our IV model. 
In columns 1 and 2, the significant coefficients 
for initial log employment interacted with the 
indicator for the 1993–1997 period indicate that 
the differential trend between larger and smaller 
plants was significantly greater during the peso 
10 The reduced form can be written:
(3) Δ  y jt =   π 1  ̂  
 
 λjt ×  t 93−97 +  π 2  ̂  
 
 λjt 
 +  ̈  ξ kt +  ̈  ψ rt +  ̈ u jt .
Note that estimating (3) and testing whether  π 1 = 0 is 
equivalent to running a regression of Δ y jt on  ̂  
 
 λjt and industry 
and region effects separately by period and testing whether 
the coefficients on  ̂  
 
 λjt are equal across periods, which is the 
approach of Verhoogen (2008). 
11 Note that the outcome variable in column 1, log mean 
hourly wage from the EIA, is not directly comparable to the 
outcome in column 2, the mean of log daily wage from the 
IMSS data, both because of the hourly versus daily issue dis-
cussed above, and because of the order of taking logarithms. 
The results in the two columns (and also below) are qualita-
tively similar, however. 
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crisis period than during the period without 
a devaluation, suggesting that the differential 
shock to the incentive to export raised average 
plant-level wages. We see that this effect dif-
fered significantly by quantile, however. Column 
3 indicates that there was no such difference in 
differential trends at the tenth percentile. The 
difference in differential trends was significantly 
greater at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth and seventy-
fifth percentiles (columns 4–6). Interestingly, 
the coefficients at the seventy-fifth and nineti-
eth percentiles are nearly identical, suggesting 
little increase in dispersion in the top quartile in 
response to the shock.
We now turn to the IV results. Column 8 of 
panel C, Table 2 presents the first stage. Our 
instrument has explanatory power: the coef-
ficient on initial log employment interacted 
with the 1993–1997 indicator is positive with 
a t-statistic of approximately 3. Panel D pres-
ents the IV estimates. The message is similar 
to that of the reduced-form results: the shock 
to exporting had no effect at the tenth percen-
tile, but a significant positive effect at higher 
quantiles, with the magnitude of the effect 
increasing up to the seventy-fifth percentile. 
(Appendix Table A2 reports reduced-form and 
IV estimates for various log wage ratios, which 
correspond to differences in estimates from 
Table 2. Except for the log 90–75 and 90–50 
ratios, the increase in log wage ratios between 
quantiles is significant).
The difference between the OLS and the IV 
results is notable. In our view, the most likely 
explanation is the reverse causality mentioned 
above: idiosyncratic shocks to wages may 
adversely affect plants’ competitiveness on 
export markets and thus generate a spurious 
negative bias in the OLS estimates.
The magnitudes of the coefficients in panel 
D of Table 2 appear large, but are plausible. 
Consider two plants that differ in initial log 
employment by one standard deviation, approxi-
mately 1.0. Column 8 of panel C, Table 2 sug-
gests that this gives rise to a 1.2 percent greater 
increase in export share in the larger plant over 
the 1993–1997 period than the 1997–2001 
period. This (arguably exogenous) relative 
increase in export share is associated with 
approximately a 3.2 percent relative increase 
in mean hourly wage or a 6.4 percent relative 
increase in mean daily wage.
III. Conclusion
This article has had the modest goal of 
establishing several facts about the effect of 
exporting on within-plant wage distributions, 
focusing on wages at the tenth, twenty-fifth, 
fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth percentiles. 
There are three key findings: (i) there is no evi-
dence of an effect of exporting on wages at the 
tenth percentile; (ii) the wage effects of export-
ing are larger at higher percentiles, up to the 







Quantiles of within-firm log wage distribution
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exporter 0.184*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.105*** 0.101***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Export share 0.302*** 0.117** 0.140*** 0.138** 0.078 0.111* 0.192***
(0.085) (0.055) (0.054) (0.060) (0.062) (0.067) (0.070)
Log employment (IMSS) 0.148*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.083***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Notes: Table reports 21 separate regressions, of dependent variable at top against covariate at left, industry and region (state) 
effects. All regressions have N = 2,531 and include six-digit industry-year effects and region (state)-year effects. Export share 
is fraction of total sales derived from exports. Exporter indicator takes the value 1 if export share is greater than zero, and 0 oth-
erwise. Changes are for periods 1993–1997 or 1997–2001; initial log employment refers to employment as reported in IMSS 
data in first year of period (1993 or 1997). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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seventy-fifth; and (iii) there is no evidence of 
an increase in dispersion between the seventy-
fifth and ninetieth percentiles. The third fact 
suggests that the increase in within-plant wage 
dispersion is not due solely to wage increases 
for top managers.
An interesting issue that remains largely 
unexplored is the dynamic adjustment of the 
wage distribution within plants. It may be that 
in the response to the export shock plants must 
initially raise the wages of engineers, techni-
cians, and other skilled workers, but that wages 
at the low end catch up over the medium run. 
The results here are consistent with this inter-
pretation, but data constraints limit our ability to 
pursue it further. Investigating such dynamics is 
a topic for future work.





Δ quantiles of within-firm log wage distribution
Δexport 
share(EIA) (IMSS) 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. OLS
Δ exporter 0.025** 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.023*
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
initial log emp. 0.030*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Panel B. OLS
Δ export share 0.011 −0.019 −0.014 −0.056* −0.035 −0.029 −0.004
(0.043) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.044)
initial log emp. 0.031*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Panel C. Reduced form and first stage
init. log emp. × 0.032*** 0.048*** −0.001 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.012***
    t 93−97 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004)
initial log emp. 0.016 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.022** 0.015 0.024* 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002)
Panel D. IV
Δ export share 2.647** 3.928*** -0.058 2.455** 3.965*** 5.296*** 5.333***
(1.227) (1.443) (0.639) (1.113) (1.532) (1.945) (2.026)
initial log emp. 0.006 0.007 0.037*** 0.021* 0.007 −0.004 0.004
(0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
Notes: All regressions have N = 5,062 and include six-digit industry-year effects and region (state)-year effects. Export share 
is fraction of total sales derived from exports. Exporter indicator takes the value 1 if export share is greater than zero, and 0 
 otherwise. Changes are for periods 1993–1997 or 1997–2001; initial log employment refers to employment as reported in 
IMSS data in first year of period (1993 or 1997). t93−97 is indicator variable that takes the value 1 for 1993–1997 period, 0 for 
1997–2001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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